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Domestic legislation and international human rights standards: the 
case of mental health and incapacity 
The right to health has been somewhat neglected in discussions about human 
rights at both the national and international levels.  States are often reluctant to 
implement socio-economic rights which they consider to be a resourcing issue, 
rather than a matter of rights.  The right to mental health has received even less 
attention and is rarely mentioned in national laws and policies, with the focus 
remaining largely on compulsory care and treatment.  The adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) therefore 
provides new impetus to explore the right to health, and mental health in 
particular, for people with mental disabilities.  By considering the rights to health 
in Article 25 and to rehabilitation and habilitation in Article 26, together with the 
right to exercise legal capacity under Article 12 CRPD and the support paradigm 
inherent in this, it may be possible to achieve realisation of the right to mental 
health in its broadest sense.  
This article explores the links between Article 12, the support paradigm and the 
right to mental health.  It also reflects on the existing legislative and human rights 
framework within Scotland and explores to what extent the right to mental health 
is currently being realised.  It suggests that fully embracing the rights identified 
in Articles 12, 25 and 26 CRPD is required to achieve a shift in focus away from 
inappropriate compulsion and towards providing resources and services to 
support good mental health which could enable the realisation of the right to 
mental health at the national level.   
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Introduction  
It is now accepted that international human rights instruments are of little value without 
effective implementation.1 Such instruments may identify human rights and direct their 
rigorous implementation but ensuring that this is an actuality for those who these rights 
are supposed to protect and benefit is an entirely different matter. National laws, 
policies and practices that recognise such rights and allow for them to be given real 
effect are thus of primary importance.2  However, the very nature of such rights, the 
national priority given to them and how they are interpreted can both ensure and hinder 
their effective implementation. This can create tensions that impact on the extent to 
which rights can actually support human flourishing.  
If we interpret, for instance, ‘mental health’ in its widest sense of not simply 
encompassing mental illness or disease3 then it is crucial that these tensions are 
resolved. Achieving this requires that a state not only ensures the provision of adequate 
support and safeguards for those with mental disorder4 but also puts in place a 
framework which, at best, prevents its occurrence and, at the very least, minimises the 
impact of mental disorder on those who suffer from it.  It requires an appreciation of the 
social, cultural, economic, political and environmental factors that impact on mental 
health and its attainment, and the need for accompanying enforceable relevant rights.5        
There are two main obstacles to the attainment of the highest standard of mental 
health. Firstly, a medical model approach has traditionally been adopted towards 
persons with mental disorder who have been viewed, however benevolently, as being in 
need of supervision and control. This has been very much reflected in national laws and 
policies which have placed an emphasis on the concept of actual and potential risk of 
those with mental disorder to themselves and towards others and consequently sought to 
restrict rather than enable those who fall within their remit. Until the adoption of the 
United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 
2006, relevant international human rights standards also appeared to unquestioningly 
accept such interventions as inevitable and merely developed to define their limits.6  
Secondly, the rights associated with defining such limits have tended to be civil rights.  
However, realising the right to the highest attainable standard of mental health and 
those rights which arguably support the achievement of this include social and 
economic rights and these generally require states to allocate resources which states are 
often reluctant to do at the best of times and especially in times of austerity.  
In Scotland, the Scottish Human Rights Commission Getting it right? Human 
Rights in Scotland report noted that in terms of law ‘references to human rights were 
frequent and explicit in the Scottish context.’7  However, it was also stated that effective 
implementation of human rights standards requires that ‘[s]trong rights based legal and 
policy frameworks must be translated into more consistent positive outcomes to which 
individuals are entitled.’8  In the context of mental health and incapacity, the process of 
promulgating rights-based mental health and capacity laws and policies, translating 
them into practice and delivering positive outcomes has encountered both successes and 
failures.  A particular shortcoming being that references to the right to mental health and 
attempts to fully realise this right have been largely absent in legislative and policy 
discourse. 
Taking these challenges into account, this paper will consider the development 
of the right to mental health under international law and the extent to which realisation 
of this is possible in Scotland. It will also discuss how the supported decision-making 
paradigm envisaged by Article 12 of the CRPD (the right to equal recognition before 
the law) can arguably be used to at the very least reduce impediments to the realisation 
of the right to mental health.       
The development of international human rights standards and mental health  
In comparison with developments of human rights standards in other areas over the last 
60 years, the development of human rights standards relating to persons with mental 
disorder has been relatively slow. As Gostin and Gable reflected in 2004: ‘The existing 
treaties and standards related to mental disability form an inconsistent patchwork of 
legal protections for persons with mental disabilities.’9   
Whilst the rights of those with mental disorder have progressively been 
acknowledged, such developments, until recently, merely reinforced a paternalistic 
medical model of disability and their consequent exclusion from society with a focus on 
treatment and protection.10  This was reflected in the 1971 UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Mentally Retarded Persons11 and again, twenty years later in the 1991 UN Principles 
for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness (the MI Principles) which did little to 
improve the lives of persons with mental disorder.12  Nor did such instruments have the 
force of being binding under international law or provide any remedies in the form of 
independent monitoring, inspection or supervision.13  
The position at European level has been similar insofar as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is concerned. Since its first ‘mental health’ case 
in 197914, and in subsequent cases, the European Court of Human Rights has developed 
guidance as to when detention and involuntary treatment is justified,15 the conditions of 
detention,16 when such treatment amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment17 and 
when it is appropriate to limit or deny a person’s ability to exercise and give effect to 
their choice/to exercise their legal capacity.18 However, the court’s jurisprudence has 
been largely confined to institutional and treatment settings.  
Acknowledging a right to mental health  
In contrast to the aforementioned UN treaties and ECHR with their focus on detention 
and limiting state interference, various socio-economic human rights treaties including 
the European Social Charter and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) require states to take positive steps towards realising and 
promoting the rights they identify all of which are important for human development 
and flourishing. In particular, and essential to such development and flourishing is 
Article 12 of the ICESCR which identifies the right to health and defines it as: ‘…the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.’  It has been interpreted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in its General Comment 14 as not a ‘right to be healthy’ but rather as a 
right that constitutes both freedoms and entitlements.19  The entitlements conception is 
connected to the ‘underlying determinants of health’ which are defined as ‘a wide range 
of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy 
life’20 including ‘access to safe and portable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate 
supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental 
conditions, and access to health-related education and information…’21   
However, despite being deeply embedded in the human rights framework, 
‘historic neglect of the right to health’22 means that the content of the right is not well 
established or widely discussed in policy making or academic literature.  The right to 
the highest attainable standard of mental health has received even less attention and has 
been described as ‘among the most grossly neglected elements of the right to health.’23  
However, acknowledging the importance of mental health, the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Health, Paul Hunt, stated that: 
 ‘…the right to mental health is not simply a concern of persons with mental 
disabilities, but also the population more generally.  Mental health is a central 
element of good health and the right to mental health is a central element of the 
right to health for all.’24   
This succinctly locates the right to mental health within the right to health, as 
interpreted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and as the 
sum of the freedoms and entitlements that are necessary to secure such right.  It 
therefore opens up the possibility of claiming mental health services and goods as basic 
entitlements, extending it beyond access to the care and treatment of persons with 
mental disorder and encompassing access to services and support intended to improve 
mental health and to protect and maintain good mental health.  As Hunt states: 
‘States should take steps to ensure a full package of community-based mental 
health care and support services conducive to health, dignity, and inclusion, 
including medication, psychotherapy, ambulatory services, hospital care for acute 
admissions, residential facilities, rehabilitation for persons with psychiatric 
disabilities, programmes to maximise the independence and skills of persons with 
intellectual disabilities, supported housing and employment, income support, 
inclusive and appropriate education for children with intellectual disabilities, and 
respite care for families looking after a person with mental disability 24 hours a 
day.’25 (Emphasis added) 
These examples of the types of goods and services which contribute to securing 
the right to mental health demonstrates the need for states to develop holistic policies 
which are aimed at providing inclusive services for people within their own community.  
The view that the concept of ‘mental health’ must be seen as being broader than 
simply mental illness has also been reinforced by the current UN Special Rapporteur for 
Health, Dainius Pūras.26 In emphasising the centrality of the right to mental health to 
the right to health27 he has noted that the realisation of the right to mental health has 
been hampered by the failure of states to recognise this and the consequent low priority 
afforded to mental health relative to physical health.28  
Scottish mental health and incapacity legislation 
 Whilst the right to health thus provides a foundation upon which to strengthen 
access to services for persons with mental disabilities there has been limited use of the 
right to health in the mental health field and national law and policy, with legislation on 
involuntary treatment generally favouring compulsion over securing the provision of 
access to treatment informed by principles of support, choice and autonomy. 29   For 
instance, Scotland’s mental health and incapacity laws are regarded as good examples 
of principled and human rights based legislation providing a framework for robust 
protection of civil rights by minimising the circumstances under which an individual 
can be compulsorily detained and treated or placed under guardianship.  During the 
drafting of both the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 (the 2003 
Act) and the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (the 2000 Act), there was a 
commitment to the upholding and protection of human rights and an awareness that any 
compulsory interventions in an adult’s life must be minimal.30  In line with this, both 
the 2000 and the 2003 Acts are underpinned by principles which must be applied when 
carrying out functions under the legislation.  In particular, principles requiring 
‘minimum restriction on the freedom of the patient’31 and ‘least restrictive option’32 are 
intended to secure liberty and avoid compulsion.  The 2003 Act has even been described 
as ‘…the most civil rights oriented laws of all the mental health laws in Western 
Europe.’33  The Scottish Human Rights Commission’s Getting it right? report also 
noted that the 2003 Act and the 2000 Act were both viewed as forward-thinking and 
advanced pieces of legislation which did effect culture change amongst mental health 
professionals.34   
Other principles in the 2000 and 2003 Acts further require that those operating 
within the framework provide maximum benefit to the individual and take account of 
their past and present wishes and feelings, as well as the views of their relatives, 
guardian or other person(s) with an interest in the individual’s welfare.35  The 2000 Act 
also requires that anyone exercising functions under the Act ‘encourage the adult to 
exercise whatever skills he has concerning his property, financial affairs or personal 
welfare, as the case may be, and to develop new such skills.’36  In contrast to the 
principles regarding least restriction, these principles promote a more holistic approach 
to the operation of the legislation.  They are a reminder that individuals who are 
impacted by this law should, fundamentally, be participants in their care and treatment, 
that they have a right to be heard and that there is always scope for developing and 
promoting their capacity.    
Research has, however, shown a lack of awareness and application of the 
principles of the legislation amongst health care staff37 and the use of restraint and 
seclusion for individuals in care homes or psychiatric hospitals has been noted as 
problematic in terms of interfering with physical and mental integrity.38  The Mental 
Welfare Commission has also highlighted issues with variable compliance with consent 
to medication requirements39 such consent being integral not only in terms of protecting 
individuals from interferences with their bodily integrity, but also in terms of enabling 
them to exercise their capacity and secure their right to health through making informed 
choices about healthcare. Moreover, both the 2000 and 2003 Acts do not explicitly 
provide for a right to health. These issues signal the need for a greater engagement with 
human rights in general and the right to mental health in particular in order to more 
fully achieve positive outcomes.  In this regard, the rights to exercise legal capacity, to 
health and to rehabilitation and habilitation identified, respectively, in Articles 12, 25 
and 26 CRPD if realised in parallel potentially arguably provide an opportunity to 
revisit this and to realise the right to mental health in its widest sense.   
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Advancing the right to mental health   
The CRPD40 did not introduce any new rights but it aligns and brings together equality 
and civil, political and socio-economic rights in a way that is meaningful for persons 
with disabilities. It recognises that existing law and human rights paradigms were not 
working for persons with disabilities, including those with mental disorder41, and in 
promoting a social, as opposed to a medical, model of disability it makes it clear that it 
is society that disables rather than the disability itself.42 For instance, in stating that it 
applies to all persons ‘…who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual and sensory 
impairments..’ the CRPD identifies these impairments as resulting from ‘…interaction 
with various barriers [that] may hinder their full and effective participation in society on 
an equal basis with others.’43          
The CRPD also introduced unique monitoring mechanisms in response to calls 
from numerous states and organisations (particularly disabled people’s organisations) 
which sought to strengthen the mechanisms for monitoring human rights 
implementation.44  In Article 33 there is accordingly an attempt to address the perceived 
ineffectiveness of other human rights treaty monitoring systems by providing strong 
innovative mechanisms which attempt to avoid the difficulties encountered with other 
instruments45  and which have been described as ‘arguably the most complete provision 
on national level implementation and monitoring ever in an international human rights 
treaty and represents one of the most innovative provisions in the Convention.’46  It 
seeks, for example, to promote ‘holistic disability policies’47 and attempts to integrate 
the CRPD into all areas of governance by placing an obligation on states parties to 
specifically charge an element or elements within government to ensure CRPD 
implementation and to ‘…give due consideration to the establishment or designation of 
a coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related action in different 
sectors and at different levels.’48   
Article 33 also requires states parties to ensure independent oversight of the 
implementation of the Convention49 in that they must designate or establish 
mechanisms which are consistent with the Principles relating to the Status of National 
Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (the Paris Principles).50  
This therefore envisages that national human rights institutions will be actively involved 
in the monitoring of compliance with the CRPD. There is also a requirement for the 
involvement and participation of civil society in the monitoring process51 allowing for 
people with disabilities to be represented in all aspects of Convention co-ordination and 
monitoring.52   
In terms of substantive provisions, while the CRPD does not contain any new 
rights, it restates existing human rights expanding upon how they should be interpreted 
and applied for persons with disabilities.  As such, in common with Article 12 ICESCR, 
Article 25 CRPD recognises the ‘right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health…’  However, it significantly expands on this in the context of 
disability by requiring, inter alia, that persons with disabilities are provided with the 
same range, quality and standard of health care and programmes as provided to other 
people53 and, in addition, that persons with disabilities are provided with health services 
they require because of their disability and services to minimise and prevent further 
disabilities.54  States are also obliged to require health professionals to provide care of 
the same quality to persons with disabilities on the basis of free and informed consent 
by raising awareness of the human rights, dignity, autonomy and needs of persons with 
disabilities through training and the promulgation of ethical standards for public and 
private health care.55   
The positive obligation on states to provide services specifically related to the 
person’s disability considerably opens up the right to health for people with mental 
disorder and includes the provision of services to prevent mental disability and to 
minimise the impact of such disability.  Moreover, considered in combination with 
states’ positive obligation to give effect to the right to habilitation and rehabilitation 
identified in Article 26 CRPD, the right to mental health, interpreted widely, can be 
understood as including not only rights in connection with care and treatment, but also 
in terms of access to relevant support and services and providing these in an 
environment which assists in maximising health and wellbeing.  For example, Article 
26(1) provides that: 
‘States parties shall take effective and appropriate measures, including through 
peer support, to enable persons with disabilities to attain and maintain maximum 
independence, full physical, mental, social and vocational ability, and full inclusion 
and participation in all aspects of life.  To that end, States Parties shall organize, 
strengthen and extend comprehensive habilitation and rehabilitation services and 
programmes, particularly in the areas of health, employment, education and social 
services, in such a way that these services and programmes: 
Begin at the earliest possible stage, and are based on the multidisciplinary 
assessment of individual needs and strengths; 
Support participation and inclusion in the community and all aspects of society, 
are voluntary, and are available to persons with disabilities as close as possible to 
their own communities, including in rural areas.’ [Emphasis added] 
Moreover, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has 
highlighted the vital connection between the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health and all other human rights and to the exercise of full and 
effective participation in development and society.56    
At this juncture, it is important to note that notwithstanding their potential the 
positive rights identified in Articles 25 and 26 CRPD are socio-economic rights. As 
previously mentioned, in the case of persons with mental disorder states have 
traditionally tended to focus on providing care and treatment within the context of the 
medical model of disability and the role of human rights has been predominantly 
confined to addressing interferences with civil rights to liberty, autonomy and freedom 
from inhuman and degrading treatment.57  
It has however, been suggested that in the context of persons with mental 
disorder endorsing and advancing the relationship between the right to exercise legal 
capacity and the right to health potentially provides a way in which to more effectively 
and concomitantly realise these rights.58 Moreover, by harnessing the support for the 
exercise of legal capacity paradigm emphasised in Article 12 CRPD any impasse that 
might be created when civil and socio-economic rights confront each other in the field 
of mental health may arguably be resolved. 59     
Article 12 CRPD: the right to equal recognition before the law  
Article 12 is central to the contention that effective implementation of the right to 
mental health could bring benefits to people with mental disorder in terms of improved 
mental health and less need for compulsory measures.  On the face of it, Article 12(2) is 
clear – ‘persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life.’  Article 12(3) goes on to elucidate how this right can be made effective 
for persons with disabilities by requiring states parties to ‘take appropriate measures to 
provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising 
their legal capacity.’  Thus far literature on the CRPD has been largely devoted to 
exploring Article 12, its interpretation and relevance for people with mental disorder.  
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has been pivotal in 
directing the course of the debate by stating in its General Comment No.1 that Article 
12 is a universal right which requires that people with disabilities are never denied their 
right to legal capacity based on an assessment of their mental capacity.60   Rather, the 
Committee says that persons with disabilities should be provided with the support they 
require to exercise their legal capacity in a way that gives effect to their rights, will and 
preference.61   
The universal interpretation of legal capacity pronounced by the Committee is 
potentially revolutionary for mental health and capacity laws around the world by 
requiring their abolition and replacement with regimes of supported decision-making.  
This has ignited a fervent debate across the globe about whether any degree of 
substitute decision-making is acceptable, and the extent to which people with severe and 
enduring mental disorders can be supported to make decisions.62   
Individuals and organisations have viewed the universal right to legal capacity 
as the keystone to securing the protection of all human rights of persons with mental 
disabilities.  Indeed, the right to capacity is fundamental for the exercise of many other 
rights, and its denial can have a significant adverse impact on the individual who is 
subject to such deprivation(s).  Tina Minkowitz has highlighted the importance of 
Article 12: 
‘This guarantee is the heart of the Convention for people with psychosocial 
disabilities.  All laws directed at restricting our freedom and self-determination are 
premised on an equation of psychosocial disability with legal incapacity, and legal 
incapacitation is the primary way that the law deals with persons with psychosocial 
disabilities.  A guarantee of legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life should result in the elimination of all such regimes.’63   
While the ending of substitute decision-making regimes is thus considered by 
some commentators as the ultimate way in which to restore equality for persons with 
mental disabilities,64 no states have completely moved to this paradigm.  This article 
will not explore the intricacies of this debate, but instead suggests that the foundational 
principle of support for the exercise of legal capacity can be used to inform 
interpretation of other CRPD rights, including Articles 25 and 26.   
The CRPD ‘blends civil and political rights with economic, social and cultural 
rights’ which has resulted in the distinction between rights subject to immediate 
realisation and rights subject to progressive realisation being ‘effectively abandoned’.65  
This ‘restating’ of the relationship between civil and political and socio-economic rights 
should alter how these provisions are interpreted and implemented at national level and 
lead to a better understanding about the necessity of actively engaging with all human 
rights.     
Realising the right identified in Article 12 can, therefore, reinforce those 
identified in Articles 25 and 26 CRPD and ensure that individuals are provided with the 
range of services and access to support, as may be required, to achieve the highest 
attainable standard of mental, and physical, health. Moreover, it is certainly arguable 
that if such services and support are provided then compulsory treatment will not be 
necessary for people with mental disorder.66  As Rosenthal and Rubenstein commented 
in 1993:  
‘Greater resources, better quality services and greater integration with other forms 
of health care and social services can make it possible to protect liberty.’67   
From this perspective, force and compulsion are seen as avoidable and the way 
of negating these issues appears simply to be by providing people with the services that 
they want and supporting them to access these.  The individual is able to exercise their 
capacity in choosing services, while also securing their right to mental health.  Of 
course, the extent to which support for the exercise of legal capacity or ‘supported 
decision-making’ can be employed for all persons with a mental disability or capacity 
issue in all situations, is far from clear.68  However, regardless of this debate, there is 
considerable traction in the argument that governments should provide services that 
people want and that the provision of support and choice in healthcare could have a 
significant impact on the need for compulsory measures.  The CRPD provides the tools 
for doing this.  
Realising the right to mental health in Scotland using the support for the 
exercise of legal capacity paradigm? 
The importance of the CRPD within Scotland should not be underestimated. Although 
its rights are not legally enforceable in the UK, devolved Scottish legislation and actions 
of the Scottish Ministers can be prevented by the UK government where they 
contravene the UK’s international obligations, including those under international 
human rights treaties.69  Moreover, Scottish devolved legislation and policy that gives 
effect to CRPD rights is imperative if the right to mental health is to be fully realised.  It 
is therefore essential that Scotland revisits its mental health and incapacity laws in order 
to assess its compliance with the CRPD and determine how it can more effectively 
translate and implement its provisions.70  
While Scottish legislation is primarily concerned with compulsory measures and 
does not provide for a right to health as such, the 2003 Act does place limited duties on 
local authorities and/or health boards to provide stipulated services and both pieces of 
legislation also enable individuals to make use of advance planning mechanisms 
wherein they can specify their treatment preferences.  Taken together with the 
principles, the legislation attempts to imbue some degree of reciprocity where the 
individual (while possibly also being subject to compulsion) is provided with support 
and services to secure their right to mental health/the highest attainable standard of 
mental health, either prior to or concurrent with, compulsory measures.   
While it must be acknowledged that legislation and policies alone do not lead to 
the development of new services, they represent a fundamental part of the wider 
framework required to secure the right to mental health.71  As stated by Hunt: 
‘…the right to health must be integrated into national and international policy 
making processes.  In this way, the right to health can shape laws, policies, 
programmes and projects.’72   
As such, the following sections will thus briefly examine some of the Scottish 
legislative provisions which could promote the right to mental health and, in light of the 
above comments on Articles 12, 25 and 26 CRPD, make suggestions for amendments 
and/or policies which could secure greater integration of the right to mental health and 
positive outcomes for individuals. 
Advance Planning 
Advance planning has been referred to by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities as ‘an important form of support’ which allows individuals to ‘state their 
will and preferences which should be followed at a time when they may not be in a 
position to communicate their wishes to others.’73  The importance of developing and 
promoting such forms of support should therefore be at the forefront of efforts to 
develop a more CRPD-compliant mental health system. 
In Scotland advance planning mechanisms are acknowledged and regulated 
through provision for the making of powers of attorney under the 2000 Act and 
psychiatric advance statements under the 2003 Act.  It could be argued that these forms 
of advance planning, as they largely74 become operational upon incapacity, are non-
compliant with Article 12 CRPD as interpreted by the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities in its General Comment No. 1.75  However, there is 
nevertheless a compelling argument that insofar as they operate to give effect to the 
exercise of a person’s legal capacity, even where a person is unable to personally 
exercise that capacity, then the requirements of Article 12 CRPD are in fact met.76      
Powers of attorney can be made in relation to an individual’s financial and/or 
welfare affairs and enables individuals, with the requisite capacity and subject to certain 
conditions,77 to put in place arrangements for the management of their financial and/or 
welfare affairs by appointing an attorney to act on their behalf.  The making of a power 
of attorney is intended to allow individuals to plan for potential future incapacity and to 
set out in as much detail as they choose how their affairs should be managed.  The 
granting of a power should be a participatory process whereby the granter is fully 
involved in communicating their wishes and feelings to their attorney.78  There is 
almost no restriction on who can be appointed as an attorney, or on the types or extent 
of powers that can be conferred, indicating that the main purpose of this mechanism is 
to advance the granter’s autonomy at a time when they are either unable or unwilling to 
make their own decisions.79 
Under the 2003 Act people have the right to make an advance statement wherein 
they can stipulate the ways they wish and do not wish to be treated for mental disorder 
in the event that they become mentally disordered and their ability to make decisions 
becomes significantly impaired.80  Atkinson notes that when advance statements were 
first introduced, it was clear that they were to be used to cover clinical treatment, ‘but 
not wider aspects of management or stay in hospital.’81  However, research from 2010 
showed that the majority of advance statements contained both information in relation 
to the individual’s treatment preferences as well as wider issues,82  perhaps 
demonstrating the difficulties that people encounter in attempting to separate decisions 
or preferences in relation to medical treatment from other issues which they consider to 
be just as important to their mental health, such as for example having access to friends 
and family. 
However, the main issue with advances statements is that the legislation only 
requires that the Mental Health Tribunal for Scotland and any person giving medical 
treatment under the Act ‘have regard’ to its contents and are not obliged to follow its 
provisions.83  This may be the reason that there has been a low uptake of advance 
statements.  Indeed, in the 2009 McManus Review of the 2003 Act it was noted that 
because advance statements can ultimately be overridden, there is a widespread belief 
that no regard will be given to the statement.84       
That being said, outside Scotland, studies have reported that the making of 
advance statements, or advance directives as they are alternatively known, has 
numerous therapeutic benefits including empowering the individual, enhancing 
capacity, improving the patient/clinician relationship and, most significantly, reducing 
the need for involuntary detention.85  These benefits align with previous comments 
about the value of participatory care and services for extending and improving mental 
health.  With the potential benefits of advance statements appearing not to have been 
fully realised in Scotland, recent amendments to the 2003 Act (effected by the Mental 
Health (Scotland) Act 2015) aim to address some of the problems.  When they come 
into force the new provisions will require health boards to place a copy of a patient’s 
statement in their records and inform the Mental Welfare Commission that a copy of the 
statement is held with the person’s medical records and where the records are kept.86  
The Commission is also obliged to maintain a register of advance statements87 and is 
charged with monitoring the obligation on health boards to publicise any support they 
offer for the making or withdrawing of advance statements.88  While these amendments 
ought to assist in ensuring that advance statements are taken into account in care and 
treatment situations and in monitoring their use, greater consideration must be given to 
ensuring that they are a support mechanism which truly enables individuals to 
proactively secure and improve their mental health. 
Services – Advocacy and Sections 25-27 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) 
(Scotland) Act 2003 
Independent Advocacy 
Another means by which Scottish legislation identifies the requirement for choice and 
support in health care and social services is through the provision of independent 
advocacy services.  Under the 2003 Act all individuals who have a mental disorder 
(regardless of whether they have been subjected to compulsory measures under the Act) 
have the right to access independent advocacy.89  The Act places a duty on local 
authorities and health boards to secure its availability and to ensure people have the 
opportunity to use the services.   
‘Advocacy services’ are defined in the legislation as: 
 ‘…services of support and representation made available for the purpose of 
enabling the person to whom they are available to have as much control of, or 
capacity to influence, that person’s care and welfare as is, in the circumstances, 
appropriate.’90  
The Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance states that a main principle of independent 
advocacy is that services should be directed by the individual concerned and should 
assist the person in exercising control over their life.91  As such, independent advocacy 
is regarded as a crucial tool for many people with mental disabilities, helping them to 
understand and access their rights92  and supporting greater choice and control for 
people who use services.93     
During the drafting of the amending legislation in 2015, there were calls from 
various organisations for the strengthening of provisions relating to independent 
advocacy in the 2003 Act.  Whilst the 2015 Act did not go as far as many would have 
wished in this respect, it has introduced a new provision which requires health boards 
and local authorities, when requested, to provide information to the Mental Welfare 
Commission about how they are exercising, and how they intend to exercise, their 
functions in relation to independent advocacy.94  Whether this will have any real effect 
on improving the availability and quality of advocacy services remains to be seen.   
Independent advocacy has the potential to be one of the most effective 
mechanisms available in Scotland which can help individuals to work towards 
achieving the highest attainable standard of mental health.  It certainly appears to be a 
vital support mechanism for achieving compliance with Article 12(3) of the CRPD,95  
given that it is not influenced by capacity assessments and is entirely based on 
determining and giving effect to the individual’s will and preference, the interpretation 
of Article 12 advanced by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
However, the lack of substantial amendment to the advocacy provisions under the 2003 
Act could, as forewarned by the Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance, negatively 
impact the availability of services that promote the highest attainable standard of mental 
health.96  It is therefore imperative that legislation clearly sets out the role of 
independent advocates and the principles by which they should operate and also that 
independent advocacy is funded at an appropriate level. 97   
Sections 25-27 
Sections 25-27 of 2003 Act also provide additional rights to persons who have or have 
had a mental disorder to access care and support services; services designed to promote 
well-being and social development; and assistance with travel to participate in these 
services.   
Thus, the potential certainly exists for these provisions to give access to the 
kinds of services and support envisaged for CRPD compliance in terms of addressing, 
minimising and preventing mental illness, and promoting mental health. This will, 
however, necessitate adequate resourcing and monitoring and the Scottish Government 
has recently noted concern that some local authorities may be failing to fully carry out 
their duties contained within sections 25-27.98  Similarly, the Mental Welfare 
Commission has highlighted a lack of recognition amongst local authorities about their 
duties under these provisions.99  A significant contributory factor here is no doubt the 
absence of clarity in the legislation and its codes of practice as to which national agency 
is actually responsible for overseeing implementation of these provisions and an 
absence of independent monitoring.  Thus, given the lack of comprehensive assessment 
of compliance with sections 25-27, whilst there may be some examples of good practice 
around the country, it is impossible to properly ascertain the extent to which sections 
25-27 support is provided across Scotland. Stronger commitment to providing greater 
legislative direction as to who actually provides sections 25-27 services and monitors 
the adequacy of their provision, and to their resourcing, is thus required.  It is also 
imperative that any monitoring that takes place to assess the adequacy of these services 
involves individuals who have lived experience of accessing, or trying to access, such 
services.  This will enable a more accurate reflection of what is happening ‘on the 
ground’ and is in line with the participation principle which underpins the CRPD.   
Scottish legislation – Future developments 
The foregoing sections have illustrated means by which Scotland is providing 
individuals with support and services that can be used, or developed, to realise their 
right to mental health.  However, as previously mentioned, where this involves the 
effectiveness of realisation of socio-economic rights this is greatly influenced by 
resourcing levels.  For example, the Scottish Human Rights Commission noted that the 
programme of austerity pursued by the UK Government since 2010 ‘has had 
consequential impacts on the availability of resources for the realisation of human rights 
in Scotland.’100  In particular, and closely connected to the right to health, is the impact 
such austerity has had on pursuing the right to independent living.  The UK 
Government, for example, abolished the Independent Living Fund in 2015 which had 
been used to support people to live independently by providing additional funding to 
address high support needs although, encouragingly, the Scottish Government 
committed to continuing to provide additional funding to support independent living.101 
However, whilst the Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance’s 2013-2104 Advocacy 
Map found that demand for advocacy in Scotland had increased by 8% on the previous 
year it also found that funding for these services had either been reduced or frozen.102  
In its 2016 Concluding Observations for the UK, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights stated that it was ‘…seriously concerned about the disproportionate, 
adverse impact that austerity measures introduced in 2010 area having on the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights by disadvantaged and marginalised individuals 
and groups..’103 and specifically includes persons with disabilities within its definition 
of such individuals and groups.104       
That being said, whilst adequacy of  funding is an important consideration in the 
realisation of the right to mental health recent research has also suggested that potential 
amendments to legislation could be made to contribute to the adoption of  a more 
CRPD-compliant approach.105 This could involve, for example, the inclusion in the 
2000 and 2003 Acts of a rebuttable presumption that effect will be given to the will and 
preferences of the individual thus providing a greater degree of protection for legal 
capacity with the resultant avoidance or delay in the need for compulsory measures.106  
In tandem with this, including a requirement within legislation to show that all available 
support has been provided to a person before compulsory measures can be taken, 
provides the individual with real opportunities to access health and social care services 
without immediate compulsion. 
The value of advance planning should also not be underestimated for enabling 
individuals to direct the course of their care and treatment at times when they become 
unwell or are unable or unwilling to exercise their capacity.  Advance planning can be 
used to both support individuals to exercise their capacity for specific decisions, perhaps 
with the assistance of an independent advocate. As previously indicated, it can also be 
used to ‘extend legal agency’ in circumstances where a person is deemed to not have 
capacity.107  It is therefore imperative that Scotland strengthens its advance planning 
provisions by requiring a much greater engagement with such documents amongst all 
professionals, not just those working in health care.  The services provided for under the 
2003 Act also hold potential for harnessing participatory care for persons with mental 
disorder.  However, in some respects Scottish legislation falls short, both in theory and 
in practice, of realising and securing these outcomes.  As noted, legislation alone will 
not provide an entirely CRPD-compliant system but it is important that changes are 
made to ensure that the legal frameworks are as robust as possible to set the foundation 
for influencing policy and practice. 
Realising the CRPD in Scotland  
As previously noted, in addition to Scotland’s obligations relating to health and support, 
the CRPD also obliges states to engage with it through its monitoring mechanisms.  
This is reflected within the UK by the Office for Disability Issues (part of the 
Department for Work and Pensions) being designated as the national coordination 
mechanism with responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the CRPD across 
government.  There are also separate focal points in the devolved governments, such as 
the Scottish Government Equality Unit.108  This has prompted an engagement with the 
CRPD at national level which is possibly unparalleled with other international 
instruments.  The Scottish Government has for instance published a Draft Delivery Plan 
for the CRPD which uses the CRPD as the framework to deliver change across all 
policy areas and services to secure positive outcomes for people with disabilities.109  
Whilst specific reference to the right to mental health is absent in this, the consultation 
process arguably provides a forum for bringing the importance of this right to the 
attention of policy makers.  It also emphasises the fact that international law has real 
meaning and authority for practice in Scotland. 
In addition, the independent oversight of implementation of the Convention 
required by Article 33 CRPD110 is being undertaken in Scotland by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission and the Scottish Human Rights Commission (known 
collectively as the UK Independent Mechanism).  The UK Independent Mechanism 
published its first report on CRPD implementation in 2014.  In its assessment of Article 
25, the report noted that people with a mental health condition are more likely to 
experience health problems and inequalities and to die younger than other people.111  
The report also highlighted the ‘low levels of disability awareness among health care 
staff’ and failure to deal with physical conditions if they are perceived to be a 
consequence of a mental health condition.112  Findings in Scotland pointed to ‘unmet 
needs’ in Intensive Psychiatric Care Units and ‘a lack of activities, rehabilitation or a 
therapeutic environment; a ‘one size fits all’ approach to risk management and a lack of 
opportunities for meaningful involvement in the care process.’113  The report also 
endorsed the recommendation from the 2010 Joint Committee on Human Rights report, 
Implementation of the Right of Disabled People to Independent Living, that ‘the 
Government make a clear and unequivocal commitment to Parliament…that they will 
give due consideration to the articles in the UN Disabilities Convention when making 
new policy and legislation’.114  So far, no such commitment has been made by either the 
UK or Scottish governments.   
While there is much work to be done in Scotland to more effectively realise the 
right to health and the CRPD more generally, the Scottish Government has firmly 
placed mental health on the political agenda.  Whilst recently announcing that an extra 
£54 million was to be added to the mental health budget  First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
stated that: ‘It is vital that the health service is properly equipped to give those who 
need support and treatment access to mental health services as early as possible.’115  In 
addition to this, a review of the 2000 Act is currently underway116 and a new Scottish 
Government Mental Health Strategy is forthcoming117 with such developments being 
continuously informed and monitored through the involvement of disabled peoples’ 
organisations, statutory bodies and professionals.  The Scottish Association for Mental 
Health (SAMH) for instance, recently published a research report showing that the 
Scottish Government has failed to reach its target of an 18 weeks waiting time for 
access to psychological therapies across all health boards.118  It calls on the Scottish 
Government to commission an independent inquiry into this failure and to implement a 
target of 12 weeks, which would give mental health treatment parity with targets for 
other illnesses.   
It is not doubted that the Scottish Government is engaging with mental health 
and attempting to make progress in this area.  However, time will tell whether this, 
together with the role played by independent organisations, disabled people and the UK 
Independent Mechanism, will achieve meaningful implementation of the rights 
identified in the CRPD by ensuring that they are integrated into law, policy making and 
public discourse and ultimately lead to securing the support and services required for 
the full realisation of the right to mental health.   
Conclusion 
Seeking to achieve the realisation of the right to mental health in its widest sense 
requires an appreciation that mental health is more than simply mental disorder that can 
be dealt with by clinical and, sometimes, compulsory care and treatment. It requires a 
commitment to providing the necessary support and services, including support for the 
exercise of legal capacity. It requires addressing the lack of parity between respect for 
civil and socio-economic rights119 and between physical and mental health support and 
service provision.  The CRPD may provide the tools to achieve this. 
The right to health as provided for under Article 25 CRPD and understood in 
light of the CRPD’s general principles and rights to capacity and habilitation, provides 
individuals with rights to access to a range of care, treatment and services in their own 
community and in an environment which maximises health and well-being and with 
support if required. This includes being able to make choices about the support and 
services that they receive and, where necessary, equality of access to justice in pursuing 
this.120  Concentrating on positive rights obligations under the CRPD may reinforce 
realisation of the right to health and mental health and provide the impetus for a 
fundamental shift in the way in which states approach both mental health and mental 
illness.121   
However, it is the translation of this at national level which is most problematic.  
Currently, the position in Scotland and across the UK does not fully reflect the 
requirements of the CRPD.  Scottish legislation is largely focussed on the compulsory 
aspects of the care and treatment of people with mental disorder and while they do 
contain important provisions aimed at enabling individuals to participate in their health 
care, they do not always fully achieve this aim.  Thus, despite ‘frequent and explicit’ 
references to human rights in Scottish law, the extent to which these include socio-
economic rights and have become real and effective for individuals subject to such law 
is doubtful.  It is therefore vital that all policies and innovations related to mental health 
take a human rights based approach, integrating ‘the norms, standards and principles of 
the international human rights system into everyday policy and practice’.122 This 
includes the meaningful involvement of persons with lived experience of mental 
disorder in the formulation and implementation of relevant legislation and policies as is 
required by both the CRPD123 and the World Health Organisation Mental Health Action 
Plan 2013/2020.124 
The CRPD and the monitoring mechanisms contained within it have provided 
new impetus to revisit the right to mental health and to ensure its integration into law 
and policy.  Scotland appears to be beginning to engage with the challenges the CRPD 
has presented and although there remains much to be done, the Scottish Government 
has not avoided confronting issues surrounding mental health such as the need for parity 
and increased funding.  Oversight of this by the UK Independent Mechanism, amongst 
others, provides increased optimism that the paradigm shift of the CRPD may be 
largely, if not fully, realised.  It is imperative that Scotland seizes this opportunity to 
actively engage with the right to mental health at all levels and to operationalise it in a 
way which results in real and effective implementation not only for those with mental 
disorder, but for the population as a whole.   
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